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Abstract 
Transnational economic integration between Thailand and Burma is intimately linked to protection for Burmese refugees 
in Thailand. In the case of Burmese nationals who seek safety in Thailand, their protection becomes more negotiable as 
economic integration with Thailand proceeds. Since 1988, hundreds of thousands of Burmese citizens have fled beyond 
the borders of their state, fearing both human rights abuses and successive offensives by a military junta intent on its 
own survival. Critical analysis of the dynamic of human displacement and bi-national economic cooperation between the 
governments of Thailand Burma grounds this study. The story is one of transnational trade across one border, where people's 
labour, homes, and passports are exchanged - in an obscured fashion - for investment, natural resources, and economic 
cooperation. The Thai-Burmese border proves to be a flexible concept that can be invoked to produce refugees or blurred 
to promote binational economic infrastructure and trade. Despite economic booms and busts in Southeast Asia, economic 
integration in the region is on-going. At the same time, Burma's government - the State Peace and Development Council 
- and its military force more and more citizens into neighbouring countries. Their reception in Thailand, however, is 
increasingly chilly. 
Introduction 
The story told here is of transnational trade across one 
border, where people's labour, homes, and passports are 
exchanged - in an obscured fashion - for investment, 
resources, and economic cooperation. The ensuing geo-
graphical analysis traces links between economic integration 
across international borders and protection for persons who 
are displaced by fear of persecution, forced labour, or forced 
relocation. For more than fourteen years, hundreds of thou-
sands of Burmese nationals have been displaced from their 
homes (US Committee for Refugees, 2001). The major-
ity of these are displaced within Burma (also known as 
Myanmar l ). Others have found temporary refuge in coun-
tries such as Thailand, India, and Bangladesh, while a 
fortunate few have been permanently resettled elsewhere. 
Despite the ongoing and well-documented atrocities 
committed by the governing body of Burma, there has been 
remarkably little progress in resolving the plight of Burmese 
refugees in Thailand, a country that hosted countless In-
dochinese refugees during the aftermath of the Vietnam War 
(Falla, 1991). Burma's military-led government, the State 
Peace and Development Council (SPDC), formerly known 
as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), 
has grown to rely on Thailand, both as a market for its 
natural resources and as a source of investment in Burma's 
historically closed economy (Rodman, 1998). This paper 
makes the argument that as transnational economic inte-
gration increases between Thailand and Burma, and within 
the region of Southeast Asia as a whole, the protection of 
Burmese refugees in Thailand becomes more negotiable. A 
study of the relationship between the forced migration of 
Burmese and bi-national economic cooperation between the 
governments in Thailand and Burma grounds this approach. 
Transnational investment across the Thai-Burma frontier is 
juxtaposed with the international displacement of people 
across this same border in an effort to elucidate the re-
lationship between political economy, human rights, and 
protection for Burmese affected by forced migration. 
The paper addresses the ways in which intergovern-
mental economic cooperation generates, at one scale, a 
functionally integrated transnational economy that, in turn, 
challenges the meaning and importance of political borders 
between nation-states. The meaning and value of migrants 
who cross these borders has also changed. More specifically, 
displaced Burmese seeking asylum and safety in a neigbour-
ing country are increasingly part of a regionalized economic 
zone that does not necessarily recognize their plight and sta-
tus as refugees. Instead, there is a transnational trade (off) in 
which human rights and asylum are exchanged for lucrative 
access to natural gas and other natural resources. This ge-
ography of displacement is circumscribed by a transnational 
political economy within the region. 
A note on method and approach 
The research for this paper stems from a larger project 
that examines the transnational social, political, and eco-
nomic ties that Burmese refugees who have resettled in 
Canada maintain with their family, friends, and allies liv-
ing elsewhere (Hyndman and Walton-Roberts, 2000). The 
Vancouver-based research documents the on-going and in-
tense personal and political transnational ties that Burmese 
refugees, now landed immigrants living in Canada, main-
tain with displaced friends and family still living in Thai-
land. Prior to the 50 interviews that provided the basis of 
this research, but after a year of meetings and community 
involvement with members of the Burmese diaspora in Van-
couver, Canada, I made a field visit in October 1996 to the 
Mae Hong Son Province in Northern Thailand. Through the 
Vancouver connections, meetings with members of the All 
Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) were organized 
in Mae Hong Son town, the provincial capital. Subsequent 
to these meetings, I accompanied one ABSDF member to 
a camp to meet with other student and former rebel lead-
ers. The accompanying ABSDF member served as translator 
during five of six meetings held in the camp, including stu-
dent leaders, water and sanitation workers, creche staff, and 
school teachers. 'Sonny', one of the former rebel leaders 
with whom I met, spoke good English.2 He was one among 
many in the camp who had recently surrendered arms to 
become a refugee in Thailand. 
Separate contact in Mae Hong Son town was also made 
with international non-governmental organizations, in par-
ticular the International Rescue Committee (IRC), and with 
a leader of the Karenni - the major ethnic group displaced 
across this segment of the Thai-Burma border. Interviews 
were held with IRC team leader and her several of her staff, 
and - through IRC - with the Karenni leader who asked 
not be named. This field visit was both a departure point 
for research with members of the Burmese diaspora in Van-
couver, and the basis of a more regional analysis of the 
dynamics of forced migration in Southeast Asia. The links 
between displacement, political economy, and cross-border 
integration in the region emerged as a key consideration of a 
transnational analysis. 
Forced migration from Burma 
Evidence of Burma's bi-national links with Thailand and 
its regional economic integration is more recent than re-
sistance to and protests against the Government of Burma. 
Since 1948, the year of Burma's independence from Britain, 
a number of ethnic minorities have fought to win auton-
omy and recognition from the government in Rangoon. 
Unfulfilled promises and other legacies of colonialism have 
fuelled ethnic unrest and conflict today (Falla, 1991; Hu-
man Rights Watch, 1992). In 1962, a military coup led 
by General Ne Win replaced the short-lived, democratically 
elected, post-independence government.4 Burma has been 
governed by successive military regimes since that time. 
By 1974, at which time a new constitution gave birth to 
the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, nearly all 
of the ethnic minority groups of the country had formed 
armed resistance fronts (Aung San Suu Kyi, 1997). Those 
whose members have sought refuge in Thailand at one time 
or another include the Karen, San, Karenni (Kayah) and the 
Mon. 
On August 8, 1988, unarmed students and civilians took 
to the streets of Rangoon to protest the repression of the 
military government. Thousands were shot dead by military 
forces. On September 18, 1988, the military government 
struck back, and days of horrific violence against unarmed 
civilians ensued. Thousands more were murdered, including 
peaceful demonstrators and school children. Many more fled 
the nation's capital to join historically marginalized ethnic 
minorities living in border regions (Lintner, 1990; Martin, 
1991). The government imprisoned political foe and active 
member of the National League of Democracy (NLD), Aung 
San Suu Kyi, in 1989. A powerful symbol of opposition, 
Aung San Suu Kyi's father, Aung San, was the assassinated 
leader of Burma's independence movement. In May 1990, 
the NLD in Burma won an overwhelming majority in the 
parliamentary election, taking 392 of 485 contested seats. 
However, the military rulers (the then self-declared State 
Law and Order Restoration Council) who lost the election 
never allowed the NLD to take office and arrested many of 
its members. They continue to govern today. Despite the 
formal release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in 
July 1995, her movements remain carefully monitored and 
activities restricted by the SPDC. 
The use of forced labour by the military government has 
been well documented (US Committee for Refugees, 1996; 
Aung San Suu Kyi, 1995; New Internationalist, 1996). UN 
rapporteur, Justice Rajsmoor Lallah, has noted in a series 
of reports that Burma's military had forcibly relocated and 
essentially detained or forced into labour more than one mil-
lion people without compensation (Agence France Presse, 
March 30, 1997; US Committee for Refugees, 1999). The 
International Labour Organization (ILO) echoes these find-
ings, citing evidence that the military has imposed forced 
labour on civilians for portering, construction, maintenance 
and servicing of military camps. Burmese citizens, particu-
larly those of minority status, are recruited under threat as 
porters who carry food and materials to supply government 
troops. Adults and children are unpaid for their work and 
poorly treated. Women have been taken as prostitutes by 
government soldiers, while others have been sold into the 
same trade on the Thai side of the border. The construc-
tion of railway lines (Ye-Tavoy), airport facilities, and other 
tourist infrastructure by modem migrant slaves for what was 
declared in 1996 as 'Year of the Visitor' is cruelly ironic. 
Curious tourists were encouraged to bring their precious for-
eign currency and witness the new face of 'Myanmar' (the 
name given to Burma by the SLORC [State Law and Order 
Restoration Council] government after 1988) constructed in 
large part on the backs of dislocated Burmese. To strengthen 
order in the capital, 'Yangoon', the government makes on-
going attempts to 'Burmanize' the city (US Committee for 
Refugees, 1999). Groups who are not ethnic Burmans have 
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Figure 1. Map of the Bunna-Thailand border zone (courtesy, John Ng). 
been forcibly relocated to ill-equipped villages in outlying 
areas. In December 1998, the UN General Assembly issued 
another resolution condemning human rights violations in 
Burma (US Committee for Refugees, 1999). 
SLORC (now SPDC) almost doubled the size of its mil-
itary, both in term of troops and arms between 1988 and 
1993. The number of soldiers grew from 180,000 to 340,000, 
and China sold the government new weapons, including jet 
fighters, tanks, and naval patrol boats, in a $1.2 billion deal. 
From 1992 onwards, tens of thousands of ethnic minority 
villagers in Burma along its 2,400 kilometre border with 
Thailand were forced to relocate to army-controlled towns, 
as they ceded control of territory, trade routes, and tim-
ber resources to SLORC (Human Rights Watch, 1998). In 
1996, the Burmese government launched a major civilian 
relocation program in the Karenni and Shan States in the 
Eastern part of the country. Some 300,000 Shan and 20,000 
Karenni were forced from their villages into designated relo-
cation sites guarded by the military (Amnesty International, 
1999a). 
Within Burma's borders, a geography of displacement is 
on-going. Many Burmese have resisted SPDC's efforts to 
force their relocation and labour by moving to border ar-
eas where ethnic minorities have prevailed or by leaving the 
country. Of Burma's 46 million people, between 600,000 
and 1,000,000 were internally displaced in 2000 (US Com-
mittee for Refugees, 2001). The total number of Burmese 
refugees officially recognized by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Thailand has risen 
from 140,000 in 1997 to 216,000 at the end of 2000.5 
The US Committee for Refugees also estimates that an-
other 350,000 people live in refugee-like circumstances, but 
without official status (US Committee for Refugees, 1998; 
US Committee for Refugees, 1999; US Committee for 
Refugees, 2001). 
Narrowing paths to asylum 
Burmese citizens opposed to their government and mili-
tary's undemocratic practices began fleeing to Thailand in 
the 1980s. From camps on the Thai side of the border, 
those seeking official status as refugees made their way to 
Bangkok, the only location in which the Government of 
Thailand permitted the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) to operate. Until 1990, UNHCR 
required asylum seekers to sign an agreement to abide by 
Thai law and UNHCR principles as documented evidence 
of their registration with UNHCR. After that time, when 
two Burmese registered with UNHCR hijacked a Thai Air-
ways plane in 1990, however, this practice was stopped. 
UNHCR does not confer Convention refugee status on these 
applicants because Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Thailand has 
been, however, a member of the Executive Committee of 
UNHCR since 1979. It has obligations under customary law 
that include the non-refoulement of refugees (Human Rights 
Watch,1998). 
More recently, UNHCR has granted 'person of concern' 
status to asylum seekers who made the trip to Bangkok. 
Many such persons were required to stay in the 'safe area' in 
Ratchaburi, west of Bangkok. The 'safe area' was, however, 
closed to new arrivals in 1996 by Thai authorities, leav-
ing some 3,000 persons registered with UNHCR stranded 
in the capital, at risk of being arrested and/or deported as 
illegal immigrants. In June 1997, the Thai army began im-
plementing a new policy whereby it closed the border to all 
new arrivals, thus denying asylum to those fleeing Burma 
(Human Rights Watch, 1998). 
If Thailand learned one lesson from its experience host-
ing Indochinese refugees it was to avoid internationalizing 
a refugee crisis at all costs. The Thai authorities perceived 
UNHCR assistance as a magnet, drawing more and more 
people into Thailand (Human Rights Watch, 1998). Fur-
thermore, the recognition of refugees from neighbouring 
countries would prove problematic when securing economic 
cooperation and trade deals with the governments of coun-
tries from which refugees fled. 
Economic Integration between Thailand and Burma 
A generally benign laissez faire attitude toward the camps 
on the part of Thai authorities that was in effect from 1984 
shifted to a much more hard-line stance around 1992, as 
relations between Rangoon and Bangkok warmed and Thai 
investors saw increasing economic opportunities in Burma 
(Human Rights Watch, 1998). Since that time, political and 
economic relations have waxed and waned. Economic links 
between Thailand and Burma are numerous and deserve 
a comprehensive discussion precluded here. Nonetheless, 
some major contours of transnational economic relations 
should be outlined. 
Trade in narcotics, heroin in particular, is notorious, and 
increased dramatically when SLORC took office in the late 
1980s. Estimates suggest that Burma provides some 60% 
of the heroin consumed in North America alone, and that 
increased production in Burma since 1989 has resulted in 
increased availability in, for example, New York City (Bern-
stein and Kean, 1996). At a more local level, the level of 
addiction among Burmese is high, specifically among min-
ers who are often offered their salary in hard drugs rather 
than cash. The UN reports that 60-70% of intravenous drug 
users in Burma are HIV positive, a chilling figure consid-
ering that '[mlillions of migrants are pouring out of Burma 
into neighboring Thailand, China and India, carrying HIV 
with them' (Bernstein and Kean, 1996, p. 16). The immense 
drug trade, much of which finances Burma's government, 
has both economic and social implications for adjacent 
countries. Much like the large-scale trafficking of women 
from Burma to Thailand (Skrobanek et ai., 1997), the drug 
trade is both part and parcel of economic integration. 
Narcotics production in Burma has been affected by 
eradication efforts by authorities in other Asian countries, 
notably Afghanistan. A Taliban decree to stop poppy pro-
duction in that country saw Burma become the single largest 
source of opium production in 2001 (UN ECOSOC, 2001, 
p. 5). Thai authorities went on record as being 'very ner-
vous' about the implications of the Taliban ban, given that 
hundreds of millions of methamphetamine pills already pour 
across its frontier with Burma (The Straits Times, 2001). 
US satellite imagery reveals that Burma has about 108,000 
hectares of poppy fields, from which comes the majority of 
Southeast Asia's heroin. In 2001, Burma respresented 68% 
of the total volume of opium produced worldwide compared 
to 23% for Afghanistan. In 2000, the figures were almost 
exactly the reverse (Agence France Presse, 2002). 
The presence of migrant workers from Burma in Thai-
land is another indication of economic integration. By July 
1997, Thailand's economy began showing signs of the 
'Asian flu' that resulted in mass unemployment amid a more 
endemic economic crisis. A new government policy aimed 
at freeing up as many jobs for Thai nationals as possible was 
developed, and by January 1998, the government announced 
its intention to deport Thailand's entire foreign 'illegal im-
migrant' workforce. Roundups and deportations in the Mae 
Sot area, where a number of refugee camps are located, oc-
curred during that same month. Before the Asian flu set in, 
Thailand had hosted more than one million undocumented 
migrant workers, of whom approximately 75% are Burmese 
(Bernstein and Kean, 1996). Not all undocumented Burmese 
workers refugees are refugees, nor are all refugees undocu-
mented Burmese migrant workers, but it is significant for 
geographers that the government crackdown would begin 
near refugee camps. Since November 1999, the Thai Gov-
ernment has been deporting Burmese migrant workers, some 
of whom are viewed as potential asylum seekers (Amnesty 
International, 1999b). 
The sizeable number of migrant workers is a clear ex-
pression of one way the economies of Thailand and Burma 
are functionally integrated. Disparities between the two 
countries are acute. While geographically similar in size, 
Thailand is more densely populated with 57 million inhab-
itants compared to Burma's 46 million. Though they share 
a prevailing religious orientation to Theravada Buddhism, 
Burma is more culturally diverse.6 Politically and econom-
ically speaking, the two countries could not have more dif-
ferent histories: Thailand has developed into a largely free-
market, and somewhat democratic state, whereas Burma has 
been a highly centralized state and closed economy since 
General Ne Win took power in 1962 (Smith, 1991). This 
latter isolationist approach shifted considerably after 1988 
when the government changed its name to SLORC and 
announced reforms that would render the economy increas-
ingly open to foreign investment (Human Rights Watch, 
1998). 
On December 14, 1988, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, 
Thailand's commander-in-chief of the army and foreign 
minister at the time was the first foreign leader to meet with 
the new government. The purpose of his trip centred upon 
securing lucrative timber and fishing deals for Thai compa-
nies in Burma. For a period of several years, Thailand was 
able to maintain a precarious and ambiguous policy of meet-
ing its international refugee obligations and forging closer 
economic links with Rangoon(Human Rights Watch, 1998). 
The 'Thai-Burma Joint Commission' was formed in Janu-
ary 1993. From this year on, Thailand promoted Burma's 
prospective membership in the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). In July 1997, on-going lobbying 
by several ASEAN members ensured Burma's admission to 
the group. However, as economic integration proceeded, the 
protection of Burmese nationals fleeing to Thailand became 
more fickle. 
The physical and economic infrastructure across the 
Thai-Burma border has grown significantly over the past 
decade. A bridge across the Moei River, which delineates 
part of the Thai -Burma border, however, remains unfinished. 
The bridge has economic value as a potential short-cut from 
Bangkok to Rangoon. It has strategic value as a means of 
eventually returning refugees from Thailand to Burma. It 
also has official significance as a 'friendship' bridge which 
signals the cooperative (and lucrative) relationship that has 
been forged between the Burmese and Thai governments. 
The bridge is based on the desire of both countries to 
bring prosperity to the area (Reuters, 1997). The 'friend-
ship bridge' opens up the unsettling possibility of returning 
displaced refugees without status in Thailand to the country 
from which they initially fled. A superhighway that would 
link Thai and Burmese coasts, running west of Bangkok, 
has also been planned, ostensibly to allow Thailand's huge 
tourist popUlation easy access to a country that has isolated 
itself since a military coup in 1962. Significant Thai and 
other Southeast Asian investment in the nascent hotel indus-
try in Burma is not unrelated to this cooperative cross-border 
venture. 
While eager to maintain favour with the international 
community for its refugee record, the Government of Thai-
land has proven at least as interested in the bi -national 
economy and, in particular, in the building of the natural gas 
pipeline between Burma and Thailand as it is in refugee re-
lations. The border this pipeline crosses is the same frontier 
where ethnic minorities rebel groups, such as the Karen and 
Karenni, have historically fought to resist government troops 
and control their own territory since Burma's independence. 
One way to secure these territories for resource extraction 
has been to sign individual cease-fires with rebel fronts. Be-
tween September 1989, when the Shan State Army signed an 
agreement, until June 1995, when the New Mon State Army 
announced their cease-fire, a total of fourteen ethnic minor-
ity armies had entered into peace deals with the SLORC 
(Human Rights Watch, 1998). By July 1998, the only groups 
not to sign with the Burmese authorities were the Karen Na-
tional Union (KNU), various Shan groups, and the Rohingya 
Solidarity Organization. As the cease-fires were signed and 
the level of fighting decreased, the Thai authorities adopted 
the position that ethnic minority refugees had nothing to fear 
by returning home. Instances of refoulement were noted, as 
they took a tougher stance against Burmese refugees, despite 
the documented abuse of human rights in Burma. 
Bilateral trade and Burma-Thai relations improved 
through from 1989 to 1994. As of August 1994, Thai-
land had been the largest ASEAN investor in Burma, with 
projects valued at $211.14 million. Thai investment declined 
somewhat in 1995 when the Burmese Government accused 
Thailand of harbouring dissidents and members of recalci-
trant minority groups that would not sign cease-fires. By 
1997, however, relations had mended between the two coun-
tries, and the Thai Government appeared anxious to clear 
out refugees from the border areas where the joint infrastruc-
ture projects were planned with its Burma partner (Agence 
France Presse, March 30, 1997). 
Production versus protection and human rights 
Cross-border exchange and economic cooperation between 
the governments of Thailand and Burma, in conjunction 
with various multinational companies, is linked to the dis-
persion of the Burmese population, both within and beyond 
the borders of Burma. This set of recursive processes is 
predicated on (1) increasing cross-border trade and shared 
infrastructure between Thailand and Burma; and (2) related 
army offensives on the Burma side of the border to eliminate 
rebel groups, whose land is essential to the major infrastruc-
ture project and whose 'cooperation' is necessary to secure 
investment. 
Multinational investment in Burma has been consid-
erable, particularly in the oil sector. In the early 1990s, 
the military government in Burma opened up its natural 
resources to foreign development. The US company, UN-
OCAL, and the French Total struck a controversial $1.2 
billion deal with Thai and Burmese state energy companies 
to construct a 260 mile pipeline from Burma to Thailand 
and to develop offshore natural gas fields (Rodman, 1998). 
Human rights organizations under the umbrella of the Free 
Burma Campaign - a transnational coalition of human rights 
and environmental organizations - hold the companies re-
sponsible for the use of forced labor in the construction of 
infrastructure, ecological damage, and the forced relocation 
of villages to clear territory for the pipeline (Rodman, 1998, 
p. 32). UNOCAL and Total maintain that the alleged viola-
tions are unrelated to their investment; they assert their right 
to continue working regardless of the political practices of 
the host country. 
Other transnational companies have bowed to pressure 
from activist groups that concentrate their efforts on boy-
cotts in the countries where products are marketed. County, 
state, and local ordinances, for example, which threaten 
to withdraw purchasing contracts from specific companies 
that have investments in Burma have been most effective. 
Selective purchasing laws bar companies doing business in 
Burma from receiving local contracts. Such laws are legal 
as long as they do not contradict or impinge upon the juris-
diction of federal government policy and legislation. Apple 
Computer and Motorola, for example, ended their relation-
ship with Burmese distributors in order to maintain supply 
contracts with Massachusetts and San Francisco. But as 
Rodman (1998, p. 33) points out, [nJonstate pressures have 
been most successful when an MNC's [multinational corpo-
ration's] vulnerability in its home market is disproportionate 
to its stake in Burma. Thus, withdrawal from Burma was 
a more viable business decision for Pepsico, whose home 
market was at risk of being excluded from an increasing 
number of college campuses, than for oil companies, which 
have been subject to less scrutiny by citizen groups and 
non-governmental organizations.? 
European and North American governments have also 
taken stands against the policies of the military government 
in Burma. US Congress passed a sanctions bill in 1996 that 
precluded new investment in Burma; the administration in-
voked the bill in April 1997. The Canadian Government 
followed suit in August 1997 with limited sanctions against 
Burma (Manthorpe, 1997; Sallot, 1997), just after the As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) admitted 
Burma to its membership. European Union sanctions have 
been limited to arms sales, nonhumanitarian aid, and trade 
preferences. Combined with the extensive campaign for 
human rights sanctions by nongovernmental actors, these 
efforts have contributed to Burma's appellation as the 'South 
Africa' of the 1990s' (Rodman, 1998). 
ASEAN countries that lobbied for Burma's inclusion 
in the group claimed that such a move would encourage 
the SPDC to improve its human rights record through a 
policy of constructive engagement. According to Amnesty 
International (1999a), the opposite has been true. The gov-
ernment has intensified its repression of the opposition party, 
the National League of Democracy, and increased forcible 
relocation programs. Forced labour among all seven eth-
nic minority states continues at a significant level (Human 
Rights Watch, 2001). 
As Bangkok's relations with Rangoon have warmed and 
sometimes cooled over the past few years, refugee recep-
tion of Burmese asylum-seekers in Thailand has become less 
hospitable. The old adage of trade versus aid takes on a new 
meaning, as trade interests conflict with humanitarian need 
and aid. While the Thai Government has finally allowed 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UN-
HCR) permission to establish a permanent presence to assist 
refugees, it still restricts UNHCR's activities. The Karen 
Refugee Committee has urged the Thai Government to allow 
UNHCR to provide aid and assistance to refugees seeking 
shelter along the border following the SPDC's military on-
slaught, beginning early in 1997 (Reuters, 1997). The Thai 
response has been to accuse the Karen National Union of 
trying to make its fight with Burma an international issue 
that would draw attention and perhaps intervention from 
the outside world when Thailand considered the matter a 
Burmese internal affair. According to Thai officials, if UN-
HCR were allowed to adminster the Thai camps for Burmese 
refugees along the border, this would 'complicate' the bor-
der situation and might cause some 'misunderstanding' with 
Burma. Humanitarian intervention could be harmful to Thai 
trade and cooperation with Burma. Likewise, Burma views 
UN-sponsored investigations of human rights a blatant at-
tempt to interfere with its internal affairs (US Committee for 
Refugees, 1999). The suggestion that refugees in Thailand 
are the internal affairs of Burma represents the domestication 
of violence and subsequent human displacement not only 
on a national scale, but within the bi-national economy of 
Burma and Thailand. 
Transnational trade liberalization and cooperation comes 
to this Southeast Asian region at considerable human cost 
for those marked by the 'wrong' or 'other' ethnic, social, 
and political locations. Within the bi-national economy of 
Thailand and Burma, the displacement of Burmese refugees 
is at once domesticated and effaced. Political protest and 
related displacement are dismissed as internal state matters. 
Land and labour are treated as state resources subject to 
the military government's objectives. Despite the obscured 
transnational trade in resources and displacement of 'unde-
sirables', the SPDC mobilizes the language of sovereignty 
in its defense when other transnational actors look on and 
criticize its actions. The Government of Thailand is ambigu-
ous in its actions but complicit in the effort to localize the 
refugee issue. 
Reconciling refugees and revenues 
The geographical disjuncture between refugees whose iden-
tity is inscribed by international borders and an integrated 
transnational bi-national or regional economy that aims to 
blur such borders presents a dilemma. How, in the context 
of lucrative transnational timber, fishing, and natural gas 
deals, can the rights of Burmese refugees be protected if 
the rights of Burmese nationals cannot? There is a spatial 
mismatch between refugees, who are product of the state-
based international refugee regime, and revenues that are 
generated through multinational investment. Talk of promot-
ing international trade and economic integration populate 
academic, governmental, and corporate domains, without 
much attention to standards or safeguards that might pro-
tect people affected by these supra-national constellations of 
power. There are no 'ethics of encounter' (Shapiro, 1996) 
to mediate the variegated politics and processes of regional 
economic integration and human dislocation. 
One might contend that the state-based rules and cus-
tomary law of the international refugee regime are outdated, 
that human rights instruments are unenforceable, and fur-
thermore that neither human rights instrumentation nor the 
refugee regime is applicable to issues generated by multi-
national investment. But the fact remains that people's free-
doms and rights are protected by national governments. In 
the absence of such protection, refugees must rely on human 
rights instruments and the norms of the state-based refugee 
regime, until some other alternative is developed. Hannah 
Arendt (1958) warns that universal rights fall prey to such 
divides and that protection is imperiled in the absence of 
a nation-state. Writing during the aftermath of the Second 
World War, she maintains that the rights of citizens as na-
tionals are far more important that those accorded as human 
rights on a global scale precisely because they are both ap-
plicable and enforceable. While non-state actors, such as city 
councils or consumer advocacy groups, show some proven 
results and offer directions for positive change, their support 
is leveraged on the basis of these same human rights instru-
ments and the SPDC's violation of them. The Free Burma 
Campaign, for example, is an inspiring model of transna-
tional coalition-building and effective lobbying, yet it has 
to operate outside of the national context that renders states 
responsible for the protection of their citizens and assurance 
of their rights. 
The blurring of borders at once opens up new possibil-
ities, but also poses new dangers. A call has been made 
to trace the 'transnational imaginary' - the as-yet-unjigured 
horizon of contemporary cultural production by which na-
tional space/identities of political allegiance and economic 
regulation are being undone and imagined communities of 
modernity are being reshaped at the macro political (global) 
and micropolitical (cultural) levels of everyday existence 
(Wilson and Dissanayake, 1996, p. 6). Currently, the con-
ventions and agreements among nation-states are the only 
codes of conduct for identifying and possibly intervening in 
the affairs of governments, corporations, and other bodies, 
despite the historical and geographical mismatch they em-
body. Until alternate and more equitable ways of moving 
between cultures and economies are developed, these inter-
national instruments constitute the only, albeit blunt, avail-
able intervention and the major basis for positive change in 
the face of violence, abuse, and displacement. 
The movement of bodies across borders is intimately re-
lated to trade in other goods. The geography of displacement 
outlined here calls for a new way of approaching politics. 
Political action, or (p )raxis is not prohibited by a politics of 
not belonging ... it is important to disrupt the home/abroad 
and the margin/center constructs for more complex position-
ings (Grewal, 1994, p. 234-35). Ironically, it is the politics 
of belonging - based on beliefs in common origins - that 
decisively include and exclude certain groups of people, giv-
ing rise to possibilities of political mobilization, on the one 
hand, and the tragic potential of ethnic cleansing, rape, and 
war, on the other (Ignatieff, 1993; Watts, 1996). These pol-
itics of (not) belonging have shaped the forced migration of 
~ -------~~------------------, 
ethnic minorities and dissidents in and beyond the borders 
of Burma. 
As long as the governments of Thailand and Burma 
continue to cooperate in economic terms through trade lib-
eralization and investment, and the SPDC maintains 'order' 
at the border to secure the flows of Burmese resources, a 
transnational political economy of human rights, or trade in 
bodies for goods, will continue. The border is 'open for busi-
ness' in every sense of the word. As refugees flee, natural gas 
will flow south, from Burma into Thailand. These transna-
tional politics generate corporeal, cross-border movements 
of refugees, though these people are no longer recognized as 
such by Thai authorities. As both Canada and the US agree 
to resettle some of the displaced Burmese selected from the 
so-called 'safe camp' outside Bangkok, the Burmese dias-
pora in these countries and others grows and with it political 
struggles against the forces that led to its migration. 
Endnotes 
I Myanmar is the name given to Burma by the military junta 
of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), 
recently renamed the State Peace and Development Council 
(SPDC). Accordingly, many people choose to refer to the 
country by its pre-SLORC moniker, Burma. 
2Sonny was also interviewed by Amitav Ghosh (1996) ear-
lier that year. 
3There are seven ethnic minority states in Burma, along with 
several additional 'divisions'. For the purposes of this paper, 
only the ethnic minority states are of relevance and are there-
fore shown on the map. Burmans are the transparent identity 
category; this ethnic group is the most represented among 
government officials. 
4This day is best known by the shorthand '8/8/88' to 
protestors and those opposed to the military regime. 
5UNHCR determines refugee eligibility based on criteria 
outlined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. During 2000, however, Thai officials became in-
creasingly impatient with refugee flows from Burma. The 
Thai Government's criteria for admitting new refugees re-
mained restricted to 'persons fleeing conflict'. Thailand did 
not consider as refugees people who were fleeing human 
rights abuses (US Committee for Refugees, 2001: 129). 
6The social health of Thailand is impressive compared to 
that of Burma, and may also provide clues about migrant 
movement. Female life expectancy in Burma is 59.3 years 
compared to 70.2 years in Thailand; for men, the contrast is 
similar: 56 years and 66.4 years respectively. Infant mortal-
ity provides another clue. Whereas Thailand has 32 deaths 
per thousand babies born in 1995, Burma has 90. Illiteracy 
at 16.9% in Burma is almost three times that of Thailand 
(United Nations, 1997). 
7The constitutionality of such state and local enactments has 
been hotly debated. See Schmahmann and Finch (1997) for 
a discussion of the legal arguments pertaining to US-Burma 
relations. 
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